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On 10 January the supporters of New Democracy (ND), Greece’s centre-right opposition
party, elected in the second round of a primary Kyriakos Mitsotakis as the party’s eighth
leader since 1974 (not counting two interim leaders). After a year of dominance of Greek
politics by Syriza and Alexis Tsipras, Mitsotakis’ election by hundreds of thousands of
voters carries the promise of a real alternative slowly materializing. This note will present
some conclusions from the election process, and the questions and prospects that are
opened up by Mitsotakis’ victory.
The first conclusion is that the outsider status is an advantage in an era of fatigue with
politics-as-usual. Mitsotakis beat in the second round of the primary experienced ND insider Evangelos Meimarakis.
While Mitsotakis, the scion of a political dynasty, cannot be considered an outsider in the literal sense of the term, he
projected himself as a voice of renewal against the older Meimarakis who was supported by the majority of the party
establishment, especially ex-ND leader and Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis. In this sense, ND supporters
continued on the trend established in the party’s previous primary in 2009, when Antonis Samaras, then also an
outsider, beat Mitsotakis’ sister and establishment representative, Dora Bakoyannis.
The second conclusion is that this primary, unlike the one in 2009, attracted the attention of many beyond the hard
core of ND partisans. The reason for this heightened interest lies in the political and economic developments since
Syriza’s rise to power in January 2015. The creation of a radical-left/populist-right government coalition with ANEL,
the collision with Greece’s creditors, the referendum of 5 July, and the signing of a new painful austerity package in
August, led many politically moderate pro-European Greeks to despair. While many of them had voted for smaller
centrist parties in the past, they were attracted to ND as the party best placed to defeat Tsipras. Based on
journalistic and social media accounts, all such voters who took part in the primary supported Mitsotakis, who thus
can claim to represent not just ND but the whole of Greece’s pro-European camp (embodied in the almost 40% Yes
score in the July referendum).
In his victory speech, Mitsotakis positioned himself against the ‘populism’ of the Tsipras government. Cultivating the
‘modernization/Europe vs. populism/nationalism’ cleavage seems like a promising electoral tactic for ND. It can
expand the party’s appeal to the centre, where smaller parties like PASOK and To Potami have disappointed voters,
and capitalize on discontent with Syriza and the third bailout. Redefining party competition away from charged
ideological terms and towards the question of effective management of the country’s affairs has been an element of
past winning strategies for the centre-right – underpinning Constantine Karamanlis’ dominance in the 1950s and
1970s and Mitsotakis’ father’s success as leader of ND to unseat Andreas Papandreou and PASOK in the 1990s.
But this isn’t 1990 anymore (the year Mitsotakis’ father defeated Papandreou). In the years of the crisis the
traditional electorate of ND, which for decades remained loyal to the party while successive leaderships pursued
centrist tactics, has suffered significant erosion towards the right and the left. Mitsotakis aims to build a broad
coalition to defeat Tsipras. But cultivating his appeal to the centre and rallying ND’s traditional base may turn out to
be contradictory goals.
First, unlike his father or the elder Karamanlis in their time, Mitsotakis has important competition on his right for
conservative voters who may be alienated from liberal positions ND will take on social and values issues. Already
Tsipras’ coalition partner, leader of ANEL Kammenos, tried to present himself as true heir of ND’s
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conservative/patriotic tradition. Further to the right, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn maintains a significant hard core of
support and will be eager to capitalize on any centrist moves Mitsotakis makes on issues like migration and law and
order. One should also not underestimate the strength of traditional conservatives, rallied around Karamanlis, inside
ND proper. Mitsotakis only beat Meimarakis by a 52%-48% margin after all, and he will need to tread carefully lest
painful internal policy debates flare up in ND.
Second, Mitsotakis cannot underestimate the degree to which Tsipras had managed to penetrate the core of ND
support in 2015. In the January 2015 elections Syriza attracted a significant number of ND voters (even of middle-
class background) who had been badly battered by austerity. In the July referendum, a full quarter of ND’s voters
followed Tsipras to vote No. In the snap elections of September 2015 ND failed to repatriate these losses despite
Tsipras’ U-turn on austerity. Tsipras’ mix of patriotic and economic populism may have run out of steam, but
Mitsotakis’ identification with liberal economic positions will do little to attract economically disgruntled voters back to
ND. After years of economic collapse, the Greek electorate is much less wedded to the party system than in the
past. Voting for smaller parties or simply abstaining (as they did last September) may be a more palatable choice for
these voters unless Mitsotakis allays their fears that he is too ‘neoliberal’.
Mitsotakis’ task is also complicated by the European factor. Mitsotakis has promised to turn the pro-European
stream in Greek society into forceful opposition against Tsipras. But Tsipras is now implementing a government
program sanctioned by Greece’s Eurozone creditors. Will Mitsotakis vote against anything put forward by Tsipras,
even at the danger of the government falling (given the Syriza-ANEL coalition’s tiny majority)? This seems to be the
idea, but is ND going to revert to the ‘anti-memorandum’ tactics of Samaras in 2010-11? Ultimately, the EU is
interested in the smooth implementation of the bailout. Mitsotakis may see his promise to swiftly push Tsipras out of
power be reigned in by the realities of the Greece-EU relationship.
There is of course the opposite scenario, as Hugo Dixon has suggested: That Tsipras will feel compelled, due to
Mitsotakis’ victory, to initiate a new round of confrontation with Greece’s creditors. In this case Mitsotakis will find it
easier to align ND’s opposition strategy with its pro-European vocation and the instincts of his centrist liberal
following. But shifting political discourse back to the question of national sovereignty and social justice means
moving political competition again very close to Tsipras’ comfort zone. And it also means making the task of
repatriating parts of the core electorate of ND (whose absolute number of votes has decreased in every national
election since 2004) that is economically disgruntled all the more difficult.
Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ election to the leadership of New Democracy undoubtedly opens up a new phase in Greek
politics. His victory has reignited the competitive element in Greek party politics after a long period of dominance by
Tsipras. But Mitsotakis is faced with the internal contradictions of his expressed goals: building a pro-European and
pro-reform political alternative, reestablishing ND’s broad social appeal, and forcefully opposing Syriza and Tsipras
in the context of the third bailout. His efforts will be closely monitored not only in Greece but also throughout Europe.
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